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In this brief survey I have omitted whole topic areas-dance therapy, kine- 
siology, and festivals, among others-and repeatedly swerved toward the West 
because of my own training and bent. I hope nonetheless to have disclosed 
some sense of the IED's broad geographical coverage, as well as the adventur- 
ousness of its editors, the high caliber of its contributors, the freshness of its re- 
search, the eclecticism of its disciplinary approaches, and the efficiency and 
sometimes downright excellence of its writing. For despite the IED's imper- 
fections, quirks, and occasional lacunae, it stands as a great achievement whose 
editors have accomplished the feat, as the first edition of the New Grove did 
twenty years ago, of commissioning essays (some of which will stand as clas- 
sics) from scholars and writers at the top of their professions, and publishing 
an encyclopedia that immediately established itself as indispensable. (And 
more so than the 1980 Grove, it must be noted, the IED reached both across 
disciplinary boundaries and into the realm of the practitioner when recruiting 
its contributors.) The IED is now by far the most comprehensive and rigorous 
dance reference source available-one that also closes many longstanding gaps 
in dance scholarship and sets a new standard for it. It has solved the problem 
noted some time ago by Agnes deMille, who lamented the lack of an inclusive 
reference work on dance thus: "Nothing is comprehensive, nothing catholic, 
nothing sweeping, and this we must have" (l:xxx). Now we do, and this is 
good news for all of us. 
MARIAN SMITH 
A Theory of Art, by Karol Berger. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
xiv, 287 pp. 
In A Theory of Art, Karol Berger undertakes something that many readers will 
think is no longer possible: a theory of art in the grand, traditional style, that 
is, a philosophical specification of the nature of art in general, comprehending 
various works in various media in various historical periods. This philosophical 
specification is also intended to yield an account of the value of art-as though 
works as diverse as Bart6k's quartets, Whitman's poems, Jean Renoir's The 
River, and the novels of Dickens all have some common value. Berger's ambi- 
tion is both breathtaking and welcome. If we are not able to say something 
general about art and its value, then we are in danger of reducing the values 
of artworks to one or another form of exterior instrumentality: political, eco- 
nomic, cognitive, religious, or tribal, as may be the case. 
Berger begins in chapters 1 and 2 by considering the media of art and the 
uses of works of art. He suggests that most philosophy of art is mistakenly pre- 
occupied with the identification of works of art. In contrast, he says, "I am try- 
ing to shift the focus of aesthetics to the question, What should the function of 
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art be, if art is to have a value for us?" (p. viii). Here Berger is mistaken that a 
great shift in the philosophy of art is called for. Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, 
Heidegger, Collingwood, and Dewey among others, all defined art in terms 
of its function and offered rich accounts of the value of art in and for life. It is 
only philosophers with essentially empiricist commitments (such as Hume) 
who focus on identification at the expense of function and value. But Berger's 
value-oriented stance is correct. Given the spectacular material diversity of art 
objects, if we are to define art (other than indexically), the definition will have 
to be cast in functional and value-laden terms. As Berger puts it, "In a prag- 
matic spirit, I take the question, What is x? to be equivalent to, What is the 
function of x? Or, What is x for? We know what something is when we know 
what can be, should be, or is being done with it" (p. 3). As Saul Kripke and 
Hilary Putnam have argued, this is not true for definitions of natural-kind 
terms such as gold or tiger. But it is compelling for artifactual-kind terms such 
as art. 
So what can we do, should we do, or do we do with art-with works of art 
in general? Is there any plausible and useful answer that can be given to this 
question? Berger argues that art is a worthwhile pursuit (and artworks have 
a distinct nature) if and only if (1) art has an indispensable cultural function, 
(2) that function is fillfillable by it alone (so that art has no external purposes), 
and (3) that function is fulfilled by much existing art (so that our theory will 
not be a mere philosopher's abstraction, out of touch with what is actually 
made and cared about as art) (p. 11). 
What, then, is the indispensable cultural function that the things we cen- 
trally care about as art uniquely fulfill? In specifying the function of art, 
Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and others all helped themselves in part to a general ac- 
count of the functions of things. For Aristotle, nature is the result of, and is 
useful for, divine intelligence contemplating itself in and through its embodi- 
ment in things; human rational nature is a privileged site of this work of divine 
intelligence, since it alone is capable of rationally investigating the rest of na- 
ture; and artistic imitations are generated as part of rational humanity's reflec- 
tion on its own situation, functions, and limitations. Kant offers a similar, but 
sparser and more frankly conjectural, teleology of human reason in relation to 
nature. Hegel and Heidegger, in reaction to Kant, offer something once again 
thicker. But none of these accounts of the functions of nature, of rational hu- 
manity, or of art is likely, on its own, to prove persuasive. They seem too con- 
jectural and too likely to privilege one form of artistic practice in the face of 
art's legitimate varieties (as in Heidegger's casting of Greek temples and 
Hol61derlin's hymns as nearly the only genuine works of art). Human beings 
have, it seems, multiple interests rather than any single defining function, and 
works of art seem to come in different shapes so as to answer to those diverse 
human interests. So how, now, plausibly, can we talk about the function of art? 
Berger's response to this question is to reflect simultaneously on a consider- 
able range of past works in various media and on how a function definitive 
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of art might better or best be fulfilled now. To adopt this method is self- 
consciously to make the philosophy of art less abstract, to bring it into closer 
alignment with criticism. The philosophy of art will hence have simultaneously 
a representationalist-realist dimension (describing much of what has been 
most plausibly regarded as art) and a critical-utopian dimension (evaluating 
the past and pointing to what art might be in the future). The philosophy of 
art must be both an account and an argument, both attentive to the past and 
normative for the future. In simultaneously representing artistic practice and 
recommending ways of continuing it, the philosophy of art will itself be an on- 
going practice of responsive critical reflection, not a completable quasi-science. 
All this is, in my own view, exactly right. It is an indispensable stance if we are 
to think and talk reasonably about functions and values at all. (This picture 
of the philosophy of art does, however, undermine Berger's way elsewhere of 
distinguishing philosophy as argument about possibilities from art as fictional 
representation, from history as representation of actuality, and from science as 
argument about actuality [p. 58]. Contra Berger, philosophy as both repre- 
sentation and critical argument runs through and across these other three 
practices.) 
Berger's guiding articulation of the function that artworks fulfill, which he 
elicits from his critical reflections on past works and on the media of art, then 
runs like this: the media of culture, and art among them, allow 
us to begin to find out what we should want and what we should avoid, to 
make choices between various objects of our desire and between competing or 
conflicting desires, to justify our desires and ensuing actions to ourselves and to 
others, to justify our feelings. Ultimately, the media allow us to deliberate on 
the question, How should we live?, to choose to the extent that it is possible 
our actions and passions and to justify our choices. (p. 66) 
Put thus abstractly, this conception of art's function falls squarely in the tradi- 
tion of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Collingwood, and Dewey; it has considerable 
persuasive power. Everything turns, however, on exactly how this picture is 
further filled in, in particular on what conception of deliberation and choice is 
developed. 
In developing his account of choice, Berger initially begins with instru- 
mentalist-sounding language. Art is able "to evoke imaginary worlds" (p. 62), 
and by doing so it can "spell out... the actual and likely consequences of [a] 
form of life" (p. 67), so that we might see whether it is desirable. But desirable 
in what sense? Here Berger attempts to balance a theory of the good (as what 
it is correct to desire) against a more pluralist and naturalist theory of desires 
(as wants that are simply given). His account of deliberation about the desir- 
able is mostly developed by sorting through various traditional theories. 
Conscience is best at telling us what not to do; it is not so good at articulating 
what is affirmatively desirable (pp. 70-71). Kant's account of practical reason 
is similarly empty of substantive normative content (p. 71). In contrast Hegel 
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usefully teaches us that "our duty is to engage in the perfecting of some of the 
practices of our society and to take care of the institutions that make these 
practices possible" (p. 72). Herder helps us to see how to be both faithful to 
our own traditions and open-minded (p. 73). Aristotle helps us to see how 
representations "teach us to feel aright" (p. 78): to pity the pitiable, to fear the 
fearftil, to admire the admirable, and to desire the genuinely desirable. 
For Berger, no univocal account of choice and its proper objects emerges 
from this survey of philosophical theories of deliberation. There will be on- 
going argument within and between cultures about what is desirable. In re- 
sponding to these arguments, judgment will be necessary, as Gadamer reminds 
us (p. 86). Taking pleasure in artworks and their original yet intelligible order- 
ings of their materials prepares us to love freedom as an intelligibly ordered 
and humanly expressive way of life, as Kant and Schiller suggest (p. 102). In 
sum, and deliberately echoing Hegel, Berger maintains that art is "capable of 
giving sensuous embodiment and representation to our most profound needs 
and concerns" (p. 243). 
Berger further describes how works in various media fufill their function of 
embodying and representing profound needs and concerns. He defines works 
of art as "physical objects produced in the process of encoding an experience 
in a medium" (p. 18). The relevant experience is the experience of a presented 
world. "A work requires being interpreted as a world" (p. 24): it presents 
something. What a work presents, however, may be something quite abstract. 
For example, following Richard Wollheim and Kendall Walton,' Berger holds 
that as soon as we see one color area behind another, we are seeing something 
presented: intentional objects with spatial relations discerned through imagi- 
native "seeing-in," not mere blobs of color. As a result, the distinction be- 
tween representational and abstract works of art does not really hold. All 
works of art present something. Sculpture can represent space (and ways of 
apprehending it imaginatively), even when otherwise abstract, as well as sim- 
ply occupying it. Painting can represent light. Most important, music too, in- 
cluding absolute music, is representational or presents a world, even if in a 
weak sense. It does not normally depict specific objects or events. In a linear 
ordering of media running from those that emphasize the mode of presenta- 
tion to those that emphasize the matter or specific objects presented, absolute 
music ranks at the far end of emphasis on mode. It lacks specific presented ob- 
jects and offers only a "plot of moods" (p. 210) or an "abstract plot devoid of 
any subject or object" (p. 212). But-as Roger Scruton argues at length in 
The Aesthetics of Music2-we hear tones, not mere sounds, as intentional ob- 
jects that lead to one another. As Berger puts it, "The tonal and metric hearing 
1. Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 46, 62; and 
Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), 55-56. 
2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997; see esp. chap. 2, "Tone," pp. 19-79. 
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of pitches and beats, the fact that we hear some of them as wanting to move, 
or as being pulled, toward others, means that what we hear in real sounds is 
something imaginary" (p. 31), that is, relations of departing from and leading 
to that are essentially discerned through the imaginative "hearing in" of what 
is there to be heard. 
Against the background of his accounts of the function and media of art in 
chapters 1 and 2, Berger offers-in a central chapter 3 that will be of the great- 
est interest to readers of this journal-"The Genealogy of Modern European 
Art Music." Self-conscious art music, intended for active and repeated hear- 
ing, comes on the scene only when notation systems for fixing a work in writ- 
ing are available. The "abstract logic of tonal relations" (p. 133) then becomes 
a possible focus of attention for its own sake, rather than something subsumed 
to the needs of religious ritual or the immediate gratifications of popular song. 
Berger sees the subsequent evolution of European art music as dominated 
by the pursuit of two contrasting ways of developing the logic of tonal rela- 
tions. From roughly 1350 to 1550, the chief aim was the embodiment of 
continuous consonance; the ars perfecta of musical Pythagoreanism with its 
consonant polyphony was dominant. From roughly 1550 to 1650, a second 
aim of representing the passions of individuals came slowly to displace or jostle 
the first aim. Beginning chiefly with Monteverdi, composers sought to "ex- 
press and impress ... the passions of the words" (p. 124) of the texts they set. 
Berger reads Rameau's 1722 Traite de l'harmonie as a reversion to the musical 
Pythagoreanism of Zarlino's 1558 Le istitutioni harmonice. In contrast, 
Rousseau's emphasis (against Rameau) on melody and the imitation of the 
passions in his Essai sur Porigine des langues is viewed as a continuation of 
Galileo's progressive musical humanism in his 1581 Dialogo della musica an- 
tica, et della moderna. This interestingly and plausibly reverses the usual ac- 
count of the Rousseau-Rameau debate. The underlying causes of the shift 
away from musical Pythagoreanism and toward mimetic individualism are 
complex. They include-at least-the rise of modem physics (with its under- 
mining of belief in a harmoniously ordered cosmos), the rediscovery of an- 
cient humanist texts in the late fifteenth century, and the general increase in 
possibilities of the development of individuality that modernity inaugurates. 
With the advent of "Classical" style from roughly 1780 to 1820, purely 
instrumental music-as Schopenhauer, Hanslick, Dahlhaus, and others have 
argued-becomes centrally important as a way of "giving expression to an es- 
sential metaphysical region inaccessible to language" (p. 135). This later shift 
returns to the idea that music has metaphysical significance, but its significance 
is now to present the vicissitudes of an inexhaustible longing within, not a har- 
monious cosmos without. With increasing secularization and changes in the 
patronage system, artists of all kinds come to feel that their work-expressing 
their aspirations for deep social reciprocity or communion-is both significant 
and yet lacks any ready audience. "By presenting instrumental discourses of 
considerable size, discourses the internal coherence and sense of which were 
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based on the harmonic and motivic logic of tonal relations, mature Viennese 
symphonies and string quartets demanded to be taken seriously as objects of 
aesthetic contemplation" (p. 138). Throughout the nineteenth century, this 
achievement of Viennese "Classical" style music fractures into a "competi- 
tion" (p. 139) between the frank mimeticism of program music and the avant- 
gardism of abstract absolute music, and the hold of art music on its audiences 
becomes less secure. 
Avant-gardist anti-mimeticism comes to dominance in the early twentieth 
century. Schoenberg and his successors at Darmstadt attempted to work out 
significant patterns of purely musical gesture that would resist both the insinu- 
ating but trivial charms of an increasingly broad entertainment culture and the 
political engineering of culture by the likes of Stalin and Zhdanov. But their 
gestures of resistance become increasingly formal and empty. As they depart 
further from mimesis, they face a threat of sheer emptiness and unreceivability, 
leading Berger to ask whether the "threat of meaninglessness" that attends ab- 
stract art music's separation from all mimeticism can be overcome (p. 149). 
Here Berger suggests that we might hope for "some form of rapproche- 
ment and accommodation between the abstract and mimetic ideas, a refertil- 
ization of abstraction with mimesis" (p. 150). We can already sense something 
of this in musicology in Anthony Newcomb's work on "archetypal plots" of 
purely abstract works (p. 150)3 and in musical works that indulge in anthropo- 
morphic gestures, figurative titles, allusions and quotations, and invocations of 
practical or social functions of music such as dance. Among contemporary 
composers who strike him as usefully working to bring abstraction and mime- 
sis together in music, Berger lists Ligeti, Penderecki, Carter, Lutoslawski, and 
Berio. 
These trends inspire hope that the canon of art music has not been closed with 
the generation of the 1880s. The perspectives of new music seem brighter 
today than at any point in the last fifty years, as the hunger for art carrying a 
spiritual significance reasserts itself and as the mid-century Cold War conditions 
become a faint memory.... What becomes increasingly more likely ... is that 
the best composition today will attract more than the professionals and the 
canon will expand again, because the most ambitious and talented composers 
will no longer see any need to continue the self-mutilating ban on mimesis and 
tonality, no longer feel that they must speak an artificial Esperanto r not be 
heard at all. (p. 151) 
3. See Newcomb's "Narrative Archetypes and Mahler's Ninth Symphony," in Music and 
Text: Critical Inquiries, ed. Steven Paul Scher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
and "Action and Agency in Mahler's Ninth Symphony, Second Movement," in Music and 
Meaning, ed. Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1997). I might also mention 
the work of Fred Everett Maus and Kendall Walton. See especially Maus, "Music as Drama," 
Music Theory Spectrum 10 (1988): 56-73; and Walton, "Listening with Imagination: Is Music 
Representational?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994): 47-61, both reprinted 
in Robinson, ed., Music and Meaning. 
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One might quarrel with a number of features of A Theory of Art. It is not 
clear that Berger's hope for a satisfying future musical practice, within which 
abstraction and mimesis come together, is more plausible than Leonard B. 
Meyer's 1994 prediction of increasing formalism, style pluralism, and empti- 
ness in music.4 Berger provides only sketchy remarks about contemporary 
composers and no real analysis of any of their works. It is regrettable that he 
pays no attention to the composers who might well be seen as having success- 
fully struggled to blend abstraction with mimesis from roughly the 1930s to 
the 1970s: say, Copland, Bart6k, and especially Shostakovich. Berger's list of 
composers of present interest seems eclectic and ill-considered. Why not John 
Adams or George Rochberg or William Schumann, each of whom might 
seem to illustrate Berger's claims better than the more abstract, less mimetic 
Berio or Carter? Berger's metaphysics of tone and hearing is not as fiully devel- 
oped as the similar theory in Scruton. Nor is his account of artistic representa- 
tion in various media as detailed as that of Kendall Walton, on whom he 
draws. His account of authentic moral deliberation is somewhat sketchy and 
not always argumentative where it needs to be. Set against these difficulties, 
however, is Berger's considerable accomplishment in mastering and integrat- 
ing enormously difficult and diverse materials from history, philosophy, social 
theory, and musicology, and doing so with enormous learning, elan, and even 
courage. This accomplishment sets an agenda to be worked through further, 
as readers will unavoidably find themselves considering and responding to 
lines of thought about art and its value-and also about music's particular 
possibilities of achievement-that Berger has broached. 
RICHARD ELDRIDGE 
4. Meyer, "Postlude-Future Tense: Music, Ideology, and Culture," in his Music, the Arts, 
and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century Culture (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 317-49. 
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